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Michael Ryan 
The difference between Professors Poe and Black on censorship is one 
that merits a great deal more discussion than it normally receives. The two of 
them are to be congratulated for being willing to take up in public an issue 
that others are content to address with sniping bullets from behind disciplinary 
barricades. Many are the well-meaning textualists who have been shot in the 
back and left for dead in the dark alleys of the MLA convention or some 
gathering of smug historicist or sociologist radicals who'd rather run a frenchie 
out of town than let him play craps at their table. And why shouldn't they? 
Interlopers like Poe say that history is a text, and there's no outside. Why 
shouldn't they be shot? If the guns are loaded, so are the dice. And it's easy 
just to let them roll because they always roll toward history and society 
anyway. Everyone knows those are real things, and real things carry more 
weight than mere images, references, signs, representations, and the like. 
Certainly more weight than fetishes, Mothers, and third rate movies. (And 
believe me these movies are third rate; I made the mistake of inflicting them 
on friends and almost lost a few.) That, at least, is the Common Sense view 
of things, and there's no reason why we shouldn't follow Common Sense. 
Everything in our culture-all the images, stories, movies, representations, etc-
tell us to do so. 
Professor Black's position is rather less polemical than the one I've just 
attributed to historians. Indeed, he can't really be accused of being polemical 
at all. Black is content to present a very intelligent and well-researched 
account of the censorship process lying behind the movies in question here. 
He concludes by arguing that an understanding of such processes is necessary 
in order to understand these Hollywood films. If we were to manufacture a 
polemic out of his position, it would contend not only that such historical 
research is necessary, but also that an historical understanding makes a purely 
textual understanding of the kind Professor Poe offers slightly questionable. 
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Outside the textual process of fetishization, semiotic oscillation, and figurative 
maneuver lies a real world of real interests that shape the images which only 
seem to have a textual life of their own. There is an outside to the text, in 
other words; indeed, one can even claim-as so many socio-historical critics 
have done-that there is no inside of the text that is separable from that 
outside. The text is history or society, and nothing more. Which leads a good 
textualist to wonder what "history" and "society" are, but let's put that aside for 
the moment. 
Professor Poe wants to be a little more polemical than Professor Black. 
If Black argues in a straightforward style for the Real (historical agents and 
interests that shaped censorship), Poe has doubts about the efficacy of the Real 
as an antidote to textual and desiring forces that exceed the censorial morality 
summoned to contain them. Textual logics tell us something about repressed 
social logics. All we have to do is look in the right places. Censorship, which 
Black thinks was successful in taking the stuffing out of Hollywood movies, 
leaves marks where it did its work, and a reading of those marks illuminates 
things that cannot ultimately be made to disappear. Censorship only draws 
attention to them by pushing them noisily into the corners (of texts). In other 
words, even if the kind of social censorship (primarily of sex and ideas) that 
Black describes is successful (and I think he quite rightly demonstrates that it 
was), censorable material remains to be dealt with. In this regard, there is 
little difference between a censored text and an uncensored one (a point Black 
himself makes in a slightly different way when he contends that certain films 
were not that affected by censorship). If anything, the censored text merely 
underscores other kinds of dangerous material, material Poe convincingly 
describes. 
There are, therefore, two kinds of censorship. One (the social censorship 
Black notices) worked; the other (the more general psychological and 
discursive censorship Poe is interested in) can never work fully. The social 
censorship of unseemly realities and radical ideas can leave Hollywood films 
looking quite innocuous and sanitized. Incendiary sights and ideas were 
successfully kept out of sight-and out of minds. This kind of argument leads 
to a potentially pessimistic conclusion regarding the political efficacy of 
Hollywood film in general. Him feeds people mindless fare to divert them 
from the possibility of getting out of line. Black seems to assent to this 
position in his conclusion when he refers to film as "claptrap." 
Poe, in describing an inevitably failed process of censorship, derives more 
optimistic results. Films contain (and also fail to contain) excesses of meaning 
that are not only textual but also social in that they feed into desires in 
audiences for something other than what the films offer them as containment 
devices. Even socially or ideologically censored films put on display excessive 
desires that do not fit into the ordered universe of the censored message (or, 
for that matter, the censored world). Indeed, one could say that the two 
forces-censorial repression and potentially radical subversive desires-play off 
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each other and determine each other's shape. The first was there because the 
second was there before it-and always will be. To read socially censored 
films, then, is not to provide a record of a successful repression of radical ideas 
and realities; it is to see how films display desires and energies that permanent-
ly threaten the powers that social censorship seeks to maintain, desires and 
energies that call such censorship forth but which always undermine it, exceed 
it, and survive it. Censorship by definition as the reaction on the part of 
systems of domination to resistant forces can never fully succeed. It will always 
simply create more censorable material. 
I'd like to like to add a few thoughts to what Professors Poe and Black 
have done by making the following double argument Poe's position places too 
heavy an emphasis on textuality to the exclusion of history. Black's argument, 
on the other hand, too heavily emphasizes history at the expense of noticing 
just how textual history really is. 
Let's consider Poe's position first. The question that comes to my mind 
regarding censorship (both kinds) is why censorship was necessary in the first 
place. Why particularly was it necessary in the early to mid thirties, the period 
of the movies under discussion? The era witnessed one of the greatest crises 
in modern economic history, a crisis accompanied by widescale public 
dissatisfaction and open class warfare. The reading of the Warners' gangster 
cycle of the early thirties as giving expression to energies of revolt that were 
released by the depression seems to me to be accurate. And the cycle of sex 
films probably can be read in a similar way, as giving displaced expression to 
desires that were set loose by the relaxing of labor discipline and social control 
in general. In addition, heightened compensations in the form of sexual and 
visual pleasure probably helped people through a painful period (and indeed, 
diverted them from more troublesome activities). While I'm attracted to Poe's 
sense of the subversiveness of the audience's desire for pleasure in the face of 
censorial moralizing, I think those pleasures have to be given a double reading 
in the light of the historical moment. There is a carnivalesque dimension to 
Madame Du Barry's character, as there is to the Dead End kids, but there's 
also something troubling about the even censored message of "have pleasure 
while you can" that attaches to Du Barry's character, especially given what was 
occurring in the social context. Let's look at the film more closely. 
Poe reads the figure of the woman as a fetish, an emblem of simultaneous 
desire and fear, and as a figure of sexual excess that seems scarcely containable 
within then existing moral parameters. Du Barry is a paragon of amorality. 
And her presentation as a series of fetish objects, from foot to hat, was 
probably hilarious to anyone familiar with Freud at the time. But these points 
raise two questions in my mind that ultimately come together as one. The first 
is what does it mean to represent a woman in this way, to assign to her the 
meaning of sexual excess? Second, bearing in mind that a fetish is defined as 
something detached from its context and isolated as an object of desire, what 
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does it mean to make a film in which, as Poe puts it, "pleasure is valued over 
politics" in 1934? To the second question first. 
It's interesting that a film set in an era of a popular revolt against hunger 
should be made during such a hungry time. It's even more interesting that the 
ultimate message of the film should be to have fun and forget about politics. 
Pleasure does have the meaning of Utopian aspiration that Poe assigns it, and 
the carnivalesque does rupture the proprieties that maintain domination. But 
pleasure can also divert, and one must bear in mind that the carnival was a 
time of contained rupture, one that did not ultimately touch power for as much 
as it imaginatively subverted it. I don't usually side with this reading of 
pleasure and carnival as conservative forces, but because Poe seems to place 
too heavy an emphasis on the subversive possibilities of both in a film that to 
me seems at best problematic, I'm going to do so here. 
Madame Du Barry seems to me to be about two things-fucking and the 
difference between the real and the artificial, with the former being shown to 
be more important than the latter. The two themes (if that's what they can be 
called) coincide. That Madame Du Barry might prove to be the real thing in 
a world of artifice is signalled in the credit sequence, which consists of a series 
of highly artificial portraits of the characters. Du Barry is the only one to 
break frame, so to speak, by reaching out of her picture, thereby indicating 
that she is real, not artificial, and that she will be a figure who will break 
frames (of propriety, sexual morality, politics, etc) that others respect. As Poe 
notes, the king is then shown standing behind an artificial costume out from 
behind which he steps, demonstrating that he too has aspirations for a reality 
that puts aside all the false trappings of court life. And indeed,, we soon learn 
that he aspires to find a real woman who will treat him like a real man. That 
this ideal woman might be a perfectly silent fuck is suggested by the scene in 
the false house with the.woman who are paid to pretend the king is not a 
king. They all ask for favors, thus betraying the charade with speech (and 
betraying the fact that they have interests of their own beyond those of the 
king). It is important, therefore, that Du Barry appears first not only as a 
series of fetish objects (hand, foot, hat), but also as a perfectly silent and 
apparently rather stellar sexual partner. Indeed, her value seems to be that she 
devotes herself to that activity to the exclusion of all else, even speech (at least 
initially). If she is a figure of excess, she is also a specular figure of obliging 
carnality, a mirror of male desire whose highest goal is good service. 
I think a reading of the film should pause over these semantic equations. 
A woman, who is equated with corporeality, is made the vehicle of a meaning 
that suggests that fucking is more important-more real-than such artificial 
activities as politics. An ideology of pleasure-the idea that people should 
concentrate on sex at the expense of concern for the world-dovetails with an 
ideology of the real-the idea that nothing matters as much as what is before 
one's nose (or one's penis), least of all ideas of moral responsibility or 
revolutionary possibility. I think this is why the censored illogicality of the 
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film's political messages is perfectly in keeping with the film's logic. Indeed, 
the censored version probably suits that logic better than a more clearly 
presented political message, since it inadvertently suggests that politics is 
illogical and artificial, just what the film wants to say in any event. The two 
ideological strands intersect in the scene in which Du Barry, robbed of the 
clothes she was about to wear to the court, comes to the court anyway, dressed 
in her night gown. The king runs off to bed with her. False clothes are not 
necessary for a real woman; and once again, the real and the pleasurable 
coincide as the happy couple toddle off for a roll in the hay and leave the 
artificial questions of politics and war behind for others to solve. 
The ideology of pleasure and the ideology of the real also come together 
in the way the film plays on the difference between the literal and the 
figurative registers of discourse. The film contains within it a critique of 
censorship. The stern disapprobation of the courtiers is in some sense a 
version of the Breen PCA, and part of the argument of the film is to suggest 
that the real and pleasure demonstrate how impoverished that position is. 
It's false clothing thrown over the real silent body of pleasure--"the same loud 
pretending." The highly connotative sexual innuendos in the film, which rest 
on a very unsteady distinction between the literal and the figurative under-
standings of certain expressions, perform an anti-censorial function by 
suggesting real meanings behind very self-consciously artificial or figurative 
statements (or by juxtaposing statements made metaphorically in one scene 
with images that display literalizations of the statements in the scene that 
follows). Thus, when one courtier remarks, "The king is mixing omelettes 
again," an activity he is literally engaged in for his new mistress, another 
courtier responds, "Who is she?," thus drawing attention to the figurative 
meaning of mixing omelettes as having sex. Perhaps the most daring of these 
wordplays is the exchange between Du Barry and the courtier who accuses her 
of (figuratively) screwing France: "Madame, what are you trying to do to 
France?" Given that "France" is the king, her response, "Just what it's doing 
to me" (i.e. "Fucking it"), stretches the semantic boundaries of propriety. 
Breen and Company were clearly asleep at the reel (or perhaps the hiddenness 
of sexual reference was perfectly appropriate to a male dominated construction 
of gender relations that placed women-as-sex safely away in a hidden place, 
either the home or the inner chambers of court). This shift of rhetorical 
registers also associates the woman with literality, with a real that distances 
itself from the artificiality of discursive figuration, a body without a mind. Her 
introduction at the beginning of the film as a body without a mouth is replayed 
in her depiction as a body of literal meaning that eludes figuration. The coy 
wordplays thus signal an equation of sex and reality, as well as a dissociation 
of bodily acts that are important and mental concerns that are insignificant. 
While I would agree with Poe's reading of Du Barry as a figure for the 
carnivalesque, therefore, I think we need to reflect on the political significance 
of that depiction. Clowns have always broken frames for kings, and power has 
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never suffered. More pertinently, in 1934, the message that fucking is more 
important than political reflection cannot really be deciphered as monovocally 
progressive. It probably addressed the kinds of Utopian desires that make 
themselves felt particularly in times of severe deprivation, and we should not 
dismiss those desires even if they are easily tracked in conservative directions. 
When there's nothing else in life that's rewarding, good sex makes a lot of 
difference. The film probably had a certain realism to it, then, not to say a 
certain symptomatic truth. But the ideology of the real and of pleasure 
conjoined also construct a kind of populist common sense that has all too often 
derailed good political possibilities in American history. It's not clear in my 
mind that Madame Du Barry escapes this ideological position. 
That woman, the perennial clown of male fantasy, should be the vehicle 
for this ideology is predictable. And if I would fault Poe's reading at all, it 
would be for not taking this fact into account. He does focus on woman, but 
woman understood as meaning—excess, mother, etc. I agree with his critique 
of the castration model, and I applaud his adoption of the alternative 
pre-oedipal reading method. But that method should draw our attention to the 
representational^ mediated play of bodies against bodies, something that is of 
a different order of understanding than the search for meaning as the depth 
that lies behind textual surfaces, and what is clearly at stake in the film is the 
body of woman understood as a pure vehicle of male pleasure. This is not a 
meaning, nor is it depth. It is a surface event of social life, one that this film 
puts remarkably on display. In so doing, it points out that social life consists 
of material needs and desires that are played out on material bodies; they are 
the stuff that resists the imposition of meaning, understood as transcendental 
archetypes like the Mother or Castration, on social life. For me, the film's 
strange radicality resides in the way it displays this basic stuff, stuff that needs 
to be shaped into the outlines of propriety that are at issue in censorship. If 
I can't fully embrace the progressive character of the positioning of woman as 
the figure for the excess that troubles those outlines, I can agree that the fact 
that this materiality could be figured at all suggests that the lines of propriety 
were in trouble. But then the censors themselves were perfectly aware of 
this. They weren't fucking around. 
The internal censors Poe describes must therefore be linked to the 
patriarchal tradition of power and to the larger political context of the specific 
historical moment of the film. The internal processes enact larger social 
processes of control of which the PCA was merely a part. That these might 
begin to shake loose at a time of economic crisis is to be expected, and it is 
also to be expected that woman, understood as a social, not just a textual 
figure, should come to represent this threatening breakdown. Reformers had 
been seeking to impose sexual austerity on working class people for several 
decades, and this would explain the power of sexuality as a figure for the 
loosening of social control at the time. That Du Barry should be presented as 
an emblem of such raunchy rebellious sexuality (I've been deliberately using 
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the raunchy word fuck for this reason) in the face of such strict moral sanction 
within the film thus can be linked to a larger social and historical struggle. 
Negative as her portrayal might be from a feminist perspective, there is 
nevertheless a positive power in her figure that flies in the face of a particular 
kind of conservatism. Woman in the film is, as she always has been in history, 
a weak link in the chain of command, a necessary slave within the empowered 
male camp who threatens to go over to the other side at any time. Denied 
access to Reason and susceptible to emotional (and bodily) demands, she 
represents a possible rejection of the ascesis of economic austerity. 
Professor Black's points I find to be thoroughly convincing. There are 
always external forces at work shaping film texts, as much as there are internal 
psychological and discursive forces. I think one needs, however, to bring those 
two concerns together, so that the external forces can be seen as manifesting 
dynamics similar to those driving the internal forces, just as the internal have 
to be seen as versions of the external. 
If one were able to do a psycho-textual analysis of the external social 
censorship system, one would probably find that it operated in much the same 
way as the internal system Poe describes in films like Madame Du Barry. 
Indeed, the censor on the lookout for isolatable shots of naked flesh, or for 
images of illicit couplings, or for suggestions of troubling ideas is something of 
a fetishist, in Poe's sense of that term. He desires power; he fears dirt; he 
wants to cut sadistically into other's pleasures. His willingness to turn a 
woman into a part object-a foot or a hand-that can stand in for banned 
sexual possibilities is not that different from the psychological censor that 
projects the woman as image of feared excess within the film. 
That such censorial conservatism operates as both sexual and social 
repression is amply evident in Gabriel Over the White House, where the 
president's ascent to dictatorial glory parallels a renunciation of sexual 
hedonism, the putting aside of a sexual woman in relation to whose power the 
president is depicted as a weak child. A closer look at the process of manning 
and unmanning in that film might help us get at the way external censors 
manifest dynamics similar to those driving the internal censors, as well as to 
understand what it is about women that might be so fear-provoking. 
Gabriel, in that it is a film that almost directly transcodes external politics 
into film politics, allows us to observe to what extent the conservative social 
and historical world out of which censorship arises is itself constituted as a 
process of censorship. It is a world constructed through representations, 
discursive figures, images, feared projections, conventional proprieties, fetishes, 
and the like. It is not that different from a movie, in other words. The film 
merely gives one further expression to a conservative representational spectacle 
that is everywhere on display in society. We can use it, therefore, not only to 
describe the psychological processes of social censorship, but also to describe 
the process of textual and psychological censorship at work within the 
conservative ideology that motivated that social censorship. We can, to use 
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Poe's controversial wording, extend our reach and read the extra-textual social 
world as a text. 
If the president's story in the film can be read as a fantasy of conservative 
politics during the era, then it is worth noticing the process of substitution that 
executes the censorship within the film. A better, Gabriel-inspired president 
substitutes for the party hack. A more homely, wifely Miss Molloy substitutes 
for the president's whore. This process of substitution parallels the social 
censor's imposition of substitute statements and images on the dangerous and 
critical parts of the film, from the working men's slogans to the depiction of 
the cabinet. In each instance, something dirty, material, and dangerous is 
repressed, and another, more proper statement or image is put in its place. 
What I am describing, of course, is a process of fetishization, but what needs 
to be underscored is that such fetishistic substitution is always, as Poe rightly 
notes, a way of deflecting something feared and threatening. What is generally 
kept at bay in conservative moral ideology is materiality, the realm to which 
workers and women are banished in the white hetero-male capitalist Utopia of 
which conservatives are the strongest defenders. 
In Gabriel, when the censor annuls illicit sexuality in favor of a more 
metaphorical substitute, a properly platitudinous marriage, he enacts a process 
of fetishization that is meant to keep a threatening materiality at bay. It is 
kept at a distance for reasons of control, both sexual and social. Women and 
working classes pertain to the materiality of social life so far as conservative 
white men are concerned, and for this reason lines must be drawn between 
their to-be-censored dirt (read potentially uncontrollable materiality) and the 
proper world of conservative platitude, substitute formations that as much 
testify to an embattled and fear-ridden reserve as to a safe haven. There is a 
necessary (and telling) parallel, therefore, between the repression of the sexual 
mistress through her sublation into a wife and the repression of the trouble-
some working class through its sublation into an "army" of labor, willingly 
subject to dictatorial discipline. Control is preserved through the establishing 
of boundaries that are represented as the markers of unbroachable preserves 
(the door through which no one can go while the president recovers; the state 
line that keeps the strikers in Baltimore, outside Washington). Substitute 
formations thus establish a line between the repressed and the agent of 
repression, and in this way, distinction, separation, and propriety are 
maintained. Proper order, dependent as it always is on (sexual and class) 
differentiations, is safeguarded. 
At stake here, both politically and psychologically, is identity, the 
self-identity of individual male rulers and the identity of the entire tribe. 
Around the issue of identity established through firm boundary markers cluster 
the figurative values of moral propriety and the literal value of property. The 
president's entire political program rests on the defense of property or wealth, 
and it should not be surprising that this defense takes the form of the following 
of certain moral proprieties. But equally important is the psychology at stake 
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in all of this. It too demands a certain properness or identity, a safeguarding 
against the threatening loss of self that is the dissolution into the undifferen-
tiated mass or the uncontrolled materiality of sexuality. 
It is of particular consequence, therefore, that the president learns 
self-control as he learns to control others. Self-control (or self-censorship, if 
you will) means bringing a threatening and unruly materiality in line, in this 
case one's own body. By becoming "Gabriel," the president gets his body in 
order in relation to Miss Molloy, but more importantly, he ceases even to 
occupy his own body. He becomes pure spirit. That this should be accom-
panied by a transformation of the threateningly sexual (and bodily) woman 
(when Beekman first lays eyes on her, he rakes her from foot to head with his 
eyes), into a caretaking wife-mother figure is important. As sexual power, the 
woman is associated with a lessening of male power (the president plays on the 
floor like a boy). But as mother-caretaker, she is also the necessary vehicle for 
the realization of his true potential. Of President Lincoln's quill pen, the 
instrument he will use to impose his newly acquired phallic will on the world, 
Miss Molloy (also known as "Pendy") remarks to the president "You could do 
important things with that pen." And indeed, he does. 
Although the president rises from a kind of childhood to a new manhood, 
his character remains plagued by passivity. Even when he gains power, it is 
from someone else-Gabriel-who substitutes for him. And it is Miss Molloy 
who watches over him in bed. How might we account for this mix of action 
and passivity? At stake in the film as well as in conservative politics in general 
is an image of the father as a source of power who must be emulated and of 
the mother as a perfect caretaker who satisfies the young boy's every 
wish-who teaches him, in other words, to be like his father. His words 
become commands that are immediately satisfied (like his father's). Accom-
panying this fantasy of power, however, is an image of passivity, of being 
someone else, of being absent from one's own body. Respect for the strict 
discipline of conservative propriety, of which the father is the primary agent, 
imposes self-censorship, a denial of one's own desires, a repudiation of one's 
own uncontrollable bodily processes. To be in control, like the father, is to be 
in control of oneself; to acquire a phallic conservative identity is to establish 
boundaries between oneself and anything that threatens to overwhelm that 
sense of personal propriety. Miss Mollo/s shift from mistress to mother 
parallels his decorporealization, and this trajectory intersects with his 
acquisition of the patriarchal phallus, the power of command and censorship, 
the ability to keep at bay anything that threatens one's proper boundaries. 
Desexualization merely allows the sexualization of the political process now 
conceived as the source of a phallic male heterosexual identity. 
A language that dictatorially controls the world by acting on it directly 
and a language that imposes the substitute platitudes of conservative moral 
propriety on the world through censorship can thus both be said to serve the 
same function. Both turn something threatening and potentially uncontrollable 
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into something one can master, much as one tries to master one's own bodily 
functions. That one's own dirt might be at stake in all of this, one's own 
physical shit, as indeed Klaus Theleweit suggests of fascist male fantasies, is 
indicated by the fact that the glorious president separates from his own body 
in the end, leaving behind the dirt of physical existence altogether for the 
platitudinous heaven of a Wasp ruling class. 
Social censorship must therefore, I would argue, be read as one 
manifestation of a psychological and representational process within the social 
system of conservatism that is similar to the one Poe describes as the internal 
censor at work in these film texts. The social censor is a symptom of the 
internal censor at work in a more general way throughout American culture, 
especially in the world of conservative politics and morality. As a process of 
substitution that represses the dirt of the working masses and the materiality 
of the (female) sexual body, conservative social censorship fetishizes certain 
very partial ideals of propriety which are emblems of an internal process of 
masochistic self-censorship and of sadistic social control, one that promotes 
self-repression as an antidote and an alternative to a more general pleasure 
that might be possible if materiality and dirt, the masses and the body, were 
to win out in this particular struggle. 
And they do win out-historically, because they represent something that 
can never be quelled or made to disappear, which is to say, materiality itself, 
and textually, because they are the motor cause of conservative ideology, the 
very thing whose repression provides such ideology with its justifying logic and 
its shape. A marginal figure like Molloy and a marginal event like her 
marriage must be seen as essential components of the film's message. The 
logic of public control necessarily dovetails with a logic of familial control. 
And the fact that it must do so attributes a power to those very personal 
dimensions of life that conservatives would prefer to keep out of view and to 
deny any significance. But, as Freud noted, it is in thé nature of denial to 
affirm. That law implies that the censorial structure of signification, whereby 
what is censored is signified by its absence, in fact engenders an allusive 
instability of reference. The workers may be silenced, but their march has 
depicted a danger. Female sexuality may be disciplined, but the foot is still 
there, sticking through the curtain, suggesting alternative possibilities. 
Repression always only creates innuendo. 
To conclude: if Poe needs to situate his understanding of textual 
censorship more within social history, it strikes me that Black could benefit 
from applying Poe's analysis to the social censor he describes. Internal censors 
are never purely textual; they are always linked to social politics. Social 
censors are always internal and textual in that they emerge within larger social 
psychological and representational systems that allow them to act on the world 
in the way that they do. What we might gain from this exercise is a sense that 
terms like social politics or history on the one hand and textuality and sexuality 
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on the other need not stand in such striking opposition. They may in fact be 
the same thing. 
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